UKRAINE

Flashback 2022. On February 24, 2022, Russia invades Ukraine with an army at the height of its power: well-trained soldiers ready to attack plus the most modern weapons (for Russia, of course). Huge Weakness: (probably) the most unprepared strategists and commanders in the entire history of the Russian/Soviet Empire. Ukraine opposes Russia with a modern army, following the example of the organization and training of NATO troops. In addition, a coalition of Allies (Western countries publicly, many countries of the Global South discreetly) will supply him with weapons and ammunition. Its strengths: experienced strategists and commanders, fantastic ability to invent and innovate, resilience. End of 2022: The Russians have failed to capture Kiev. The same for Donbas. In addition, they lost a good part of what they had managed to occupy at the very beginning of the war (i.e. the Kharkov–Lyman area in the southeast and Kherson in the south).

Flashback 2023. On the Russian side: despite multiple attacks - with heavy losses in men and equipment - they have everything they need to gain a few hundred square kilometers, say 0.1% of the surface of Ukraine. The waves of Russian missiles in the winter of 2022/2023 failed to destroy Ukraine's energy infrastructure. On the Ukrainian side: two strategic victories and one tactical failure. Failure: Ukrainian ground offensive almost recaptured occupied territory. Most Important Strategic Victory: At the end of 2023, it became clear that Crimea would belong to whoever won the war. However, as of early 2023, Crimea's membership of Russia was seen as being acquired forever by certain Allies, with the United States and Germany leading the way. How did we get here? The Ukrainians have turned Crimea into a battlefield, multiplying attacks against 'high-value' targets there (fuel and ammunition depots, air defense batteries, radars, shipyard command centers, Black Sea fleet ships). Storm Shadow (UK data) and Scalp (France) drone attacks (air and naval) and missiles. More special forces attacks, too. The results are astounding, most of the targets pursued have been hit, destroyed or at least severely damaged. The Kerch Bridge linking Crimea to Russia - essential for bringing food into Crimea and also supplying Russian troops in southern Ukraine - has been attacked and damaged for the second time. The other strategic victory: the Russian Black Sea fleet was put out of action. At least 30% of his ships are destroyed. The others are either confined to the port of Sevastopol or withdrawn completely outside the Black Sea, in the Sea of ​​Azov. On September 22, his headquarters was badly damaged by a rocket strike. The admiral commander of the fleet and several of his officers were killed, many others were wounded. As a result, Ukraine was able to resume grain exports via this sea route. Most likely, the sea route will be used in 2024 for import-export operations and other products.

The 70-75% scenario - the most likely

Ukraine's side: Military aid (F16 jets, munitions, missiles) and financial aid from its allies will continue and increase, while for the United States, it will remain suspended on Biden's decision to act decisively for the victory of Ukraine or not ( read the articles on the subject, already published on this blog). Military operations: Ukrainians will not carry out massive ground attacks this year, as they will not have the means to do so (no planes, few tanks and heavy guns, insufficient ammunition). However, they will be stockpiling military equipment donated by the Allies for a possible decisive offensive probably in the summer of 2025. There will be no territory recovered from Russian occupation, barring a miracle (ie: a collapse of part of the Russian Front) . On the other hand, Ukraine will intensify drone and Storm Shadow/Scalp missile airstrikes against 'high-value' targets in the temporarily occupied Russian territories of Ukraine and Crimea. Specifically, the Ukrainians will try to destroy Russian air defenses with the idea of ​​more quietly flying their own F16s (which should start arriving in the second half of 2024). Also, the Ukrainians will intensify their attacks in Russia, targeting mainly easily 'flammable' targets (refineries, fuel depots, fuel transport facilities), but also other 'interesting' targets (railroads, airfields, power centers). On the Russian side: The Russians, having regained the initiative on the battlefields at the end of 2023, will continue and intensify ground attacks with the aim of occupying a larger part of Ukraine (starting with the Ukrainian-held parts of these four annexed regions in September 2022: Kherson, Zaporizhia, Luhansk and Donetsk). Success will be limited – at best, at the end of 2024, they will have 2-3,000 square kilometers more than today. But they will pay dearly in both human lives and military equipment. All this because there will be no major changes in the ranks of military commanders and therefore no significant improvements in the tactics used on the ground. Officially, the Russian military industry will produce 800% more ammunition and military equipment compared to 2023; in reality, it is up to 50% by 2023.

The 20-25% scenario - unlikely

Cut military and financial aid from its Allies by up to 50% by 2023. Zero aid from the United States. Consequences for Ukraine: shortage of ammunition and military equipment and the inability to maintain the entire front line as it was at the end of 2023. Ukraine will have to significantly reduce its missile attacks in the territories temporarily occupied by the Russians in Ukraine and Crimea. On the other hand, they will try to increase drone and special forces attacks, including in Russia. On the other hand, the Russians will start appointing capable and experienced commanders to lead the units fighting on the Ukrainian fronts. They will continue and intensify ground attacks and will succeed in occupying a certain part of Ukrainian territory. By the end of 2024, they will hold several thousand to several tens of thousands more square kilometers than at the end of 2024 (if there are commanders more or less capable of running the war in Ukraine). The Russian military industry will actually produce up to 100% more ammunition and military equipment compared to 2023.

0-5% scenario - very unlikely

Aid to Ukraine - after a small increase at the beginning of the year, very quickly, it decreases and will stop completely towards the end of February, March later. No recovery until the end of the year. Consequences for Ukraine: major shortage of ammunition and military equipment and the inability to maintain the entire front line as it was at the end of 2023. Ukraine will no longer be able to attack targets with missiles in the territories temporarily occupied by the Russians in Ukraine and Crimea. At the same time, the number of attacks by drones and special forces, including in Russia, will decrease compared to 2023. On the other hand, the Russians will greatly intensify ground attacks and will manage to occupy a significant part - between 30 and 50% of the territory Ukrainian at the end of 2024 vs. 2023. Several medium-sized cities fell for Russian forces; Kharkov was surrounded and besieged. Kiev and Odessa – Russian forces are at the gates preparing to launch the final assault). The Russian military industry will actually produce up to 200% more ammunition and military equipment compared to 2023.

Black Swan 1 – The Disappearance of Zelensky

Accidental Death/Disease/Assassination: No significant changes to his allies' aid and support. Some morale decline for Ukrainians. The second man in power – the President of the Supreme Rada (Parliament) – will become acting President. Strong popular pressure for Valery Zalouzhny - the very popular 'chief' of the army - to take over. He will clearly refuse, because his job is to win the war against occupying Russia, and he does not understand giving up this goal. He will, however, agree to support the interim president on military matters, which will mean that the conduct of the war, including its objectives, will be decided solely by the military (unlike what happens today when they are decided by politicians with consultation from the army). The Ukrainians may be psychologically beaten down by the Russians, or they will most likely show enormous anger and a desire to make the Russians pay for this attack. Huge gain in world sympathy, quickly translated into a sharp increase in military aid to Ukraine (including the most modern and effective weapons in the Allies' arsenal).

Black Swan 2 – The Disappearance of Putin

Accident/illness or assassination - it doesn't matter, it's a disaster for Russia. War of succession, fratricide, between the various clans of Russian power. Neither the Army nor the Secret Service have capable/popular leaders at their helm – as a result, various factions within their ranks will join various contenders to follow Putin. Some leaders of the wealthier regions/republics or those furthest from the center – led by Chechnya's Ramzan Kadyrov – will seek to be independent. Some suitors will ask foreign powers for help—in the West from the Ukrainians, in the East from the Chinese—in exchange for favors. The end: several so-called 'independent' states, in reality under the control of foreign powers (EU, Ukraine, China, Turkey through Azerbaijan).